
$100 Billion for Critical Minerals, and Still No Rare-Earth Market
Washington has $100 billion earmarked for critical minerals, yet a rare-earth lobby that seeks waivers, not supply chains. Four CFR analysts propose three fixes.
- By
- Nathan Brooks
- Filed
- Channel
- Chips & Policy
- Read
- 4 min read
The Pentagon holds $200 billion in loan authority, with $100 billion earmarked for critical minerals, and the money is moving out the door. The harder problem, four analysts at the Council on Foreign Relations argue, is that no constituency exists to stop the next Congress from walking away. "Capital, ironically, is the easy part," write Kirsten Asdal, Thomas J. Koch, Chryssa Rask and Tao Tan in a recent analysis. "Washington faces what game theorists call a commitment problem."
Why a few dollars stopped a $40,000 vehicle
In May 2025, Ford halted Explorer assembly in Chicago for a week. The cause was neither strike nor equipment failure. It was China's new export licensing regime for rare-earth magnets, components that run braking, steering, fuel injectors and power seats in electric motors. The magnets cost a few dollars each. Their absence stopped production of a $40,000 vehicle.
The policy backdrop is large. The Office of Strategic Capital, created under President Biden, received its allocation under President Trump's One Big Beautiful Bill Act. Yet the authors note that rebuilding a supply chain takes a decade or more of consistent support, while Congress budgets annually and faces elections every two years.
What happens on January 1, 2027?
A Pentagon rule, DFARS 252.225-7052, is set to bar rare-earth magnets with any Chinese content from defense supply chains. It is already a year late. Major defense contractors have pushed aggressively for delays and waivers because no Western source can meet their needs. Their interest is securing supply, not its origin. The lobby that exists in rare earths, the authors write, "is pointed in the wrong direction."
Private investors, they add, are fundamentally uninterested: the projects are unprofitable and complex relative to other opportunities. Beijing, holding a near-monopoly, can make the same material worthless or priceless on command.
How do you build a market that does not exist?
Their first proposal borrows from health care. Hospitals buy supplies through group purchasing organizations; Washington could charter a rare-earth GPO and pair it with the Defense Logistics Agency's procurement experience. Today there is no global benchmark price for rare earths, no equivalent of West Texas Intermediate or Brent. Buyers face bilateral deals shielded by nondisclosure agreements. Investors cannot finance projects whose output has no reliable price.
Producers backed by the government could be required to sell a portion of offtake through the GPO. Project Vault, the administration's $12 billion critical minerals stockpile, could join as a member. A profitable GPO could eventually be spun off, much as Nasdaq and the New York Stock Exchange separated from their parents in 2006. Section 708 of the Defense Production Act already permits such coordination; the Department of Energy used it to gather nearly one hundred nuclear fuel companies into a consortium.
Should offtake be traded for coinvestment?
Current deals, such as the one with MP Materials, allocate offtake through a waterfall: defense primes first, then the defense industrial base, then U.S. companies, allies, and finally non-embargoed countries. In effect, the authors write, "it gives access away without asking anything in return." They propose reserving 40 percent of offtake for vetted strategic coinvestors who put in capital alongside the government, paired with contingent convertible financing and a price floor.
Japan offers the precedent. After China flexed its rare-earth leverage in the 2010 maritime dispute, a consortium of Sojitz Corporation, the state-owned Japan Organization for Metals and Energy Security and the trade ministry invested $250 million in Australia's Lynas for priority offtake. Japan's reliance on China for rare-earth elements has since fallen from 90 to 60 percent.
Can a scorecard outlast Solyndra?
The Loan Programs Office of the Biden era, now the Office of Energy Dominance Financing, issued only about a quarter of its $412 billion authority; $83 billion has since been canceled or restructured. Solyndra's $528 million bankruptcy in 2011 still haunts policy, even though the Energy Department program turned profitable by 2014. The authors urge whole-of-government tracking of wins and losses, judged as a portfolio.
They close with a caution: subsidies need sunsets tied to output targets, not fixed dates, which would only tell Beijing how long to wait. Beijing's chokepoint, they conclude, "is a bet on American political dysfunction." The coming test is whether a future Congress honors the offtake agreements and price floors already signed.
Source: cfr.org
More from Nathan Brooks
Show full bio
Senior reporter covering people, launches and day-to-day practice in Semiconductors, chip manufacturing, hardware, AI compute at Chip Dispatch.
1,010 articles
Related articles
voters-rejected-ai-data-centers-in-40-of-41-local-elections
Voters Rejected AI Data Centers in 40 of 41 Local Elections
chips-act-fabs-advance-but-11-billion-r-d-pot-sits-mostly-idle-bc7d0471
CHIPS Act Fabs Advance, but $11 Billion R&D Pot Sits Mostly Idle
35-chip-tax-credit-hangs-on-groundbreaking-deadline-after-midterms
35% Chip Tax Credit Hangs on Groundbreaking Deadline After Midterms
harbinger-raises-240m-series-d-chasing-fedex-trucks-and-defense-work
Harbinger Raises $240M Series D, Chasing FedEx Trucks and Defense Work


