The Information Technology and Innovation Foundation published a policy blog on December 19, 2025, arguing that US export controls should be calibrated to advance, rather than undermine, American semiconductor leadership. The piece, titled "Export Controls Should Advance US Semiconductor Leadership," adds to a year-long debate over whether restrictions on advanced chips and equipment have slowed China's progress or simply redirected its build-out toward legacy nodes.

What is ITIF's position?

ITIF is a Washington-based technology policy think tank that has consistently framed export controls as an industrial-policy tool. Its December blog enters a discussion that intensified after the Commerce Department's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) tightened rules on advanced graphics processors, EDA software, and extreme ultraviolet (EUV)-related tooling in 2022 and 2023. The think tank's core argument, reflected in its title, is that controls should reinforce the commercial position of US-based designers and manufacturers rather than create openings for foreign competitors to capture share in adjacent market segments.

Where do the contested numbers sit?

Two figures sit at the center of the policy argument, even though neither appears in the ITIF title itself:

• China's share of global mature-node wafer capacity, estimated by TrendForce and SEMI at roughly 28–30% as of 2024, a level that has drawn calls from US and EU policymakers for additional guardrails on trailing-edge production
• Global semiconductor revenue, which the Semiconductor Industry Association reported at $527 billion in 2023, with US-headquartered firms holding approximately 50% of the market

Analyst estimates and policy forecasts diverge sharply on how those numbers will move if controls tighten further. Industry groups such as SIA have warned that blanket restrictions risk ceding ground in commodity logic, analog, and power-device segments where Chinese foundries, including SMIC, are already adding 200mm and 300mm capacity.

How does this fit the broader policy stack?

The ITIF blog lands in the middle of a policy review calendar:

• CHIPS and Science Act funding has steered more than $30 billion in announced subsidies to TSMC's Arizona fabs, Samsung's Taylor facility, and Intel's Ohio and Arizona sites since 2022
• BIS export-control revisions in October 2023 and December 2024 added new licensing requirements for high-bandwidth memory and certain AI accelerators
• Dutch and Japanese alignment with US equipment restrictions has constrained ASML's ability to ship EUV scanners and Nikon/Canon shipments of deep-ultraviolet immersion tools into mainland China

The interaction between subsidy policy and export policy is the question ITIF's title implicitly raises: do federal subsidies to domestic fabs translate into commercial advantage if allied equipment makers can still ship tools that ultimately enable competing capacity elsewhere?

What does the source actually contain?

The December 19 ITIF blog itself, as referenced in the available source data, offers a policy framing rather than disclosed capacity figures or pricing data. Readers seeking specific recommendations, attributed quotations, or numerical projections will need to consult the full ITIF publication directly. The title's verb ("should") signals that the piece is prescriptive, arguing for a particular alignment between trade restrictions and the commercial interests of US-headquartered chipmakers, fabless designers, and equipment vendors.

What to watch next

The policy calendar into 2026 will determine whether ITIF's argument gains traction. The next BIS rule revision, expected in early 2026, is likely to address advanced packaging, HBM stack heights, and sub-7nm process node licensing. Equipment-export alignment with the Netherlands and Japan is also up for renewal. If new rules preserve US firms' access to leading-edge capacity while closing remaining routes for advanced tool shipments to China, the commercial case ITIF describes would strengthen; if allied alignment frays, the argument will have to contend with a more fragmented enforcement picture.