The Netherlands holds decisive leverage over the global semiconductor supply chain — but that leverage does not translate into strategic independence, according to a new analysis from The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS).

The report, titled "Leverage without independence: The Netherlands and the geopolitics of semiconductor chokepoints," examines a paradox at the core of Dutch industrial and foreign policy. The country controls one of the most consequential bottlenecks in advanced chipmaking, yet it cannot set the rules of the game on its own. Washington, Brussels and Beijing all shape how that leverage can actually be used.

Why does a small country matter to chipmaking?

The answer lies in chokepoints. Modern semiconductor production spans thousands of specialized steps, and only a handful of firms worldwide can perform certain ones. When a single supplier dominates a critical step, its home country gains outsized geopolitical weight — the ability to deny adversaries access to technology they cannot source elsewhere.

HCSS argues the Netherlands occupies exactly such a position. The Dutch semiconductor equipment sector is a node that no advanced chip manufacturer can bypass. That gives The Hague a seat at the table in export-control negotiations it would not otherwise command.

What is the difference between leverage and independence?

The report's central distinction is between the two concepts in its title. Leverage means other powers need what you have. Independence means you can pursue your interests without their consent.

The Netherlands, HCSS contends, has the first but not the second. Dutch chokepoint power depends on alliances, supply chains and market access that run through other states. If Washington tightens export restrictions, The Hague has limited room to diverge without endangering its security relationship. If Beijing retaliates against Dutch exports, the Dutch economy absorbs the shock. Leverage, in other words, is real but conditional — rented from the geopolitical structure rather than owned.

How does this reshape Dutch policy?

The analysis frames the semiconductor sector as a case study in how middle powers should think about economic security. Three implications stand out from the report's framing:

• Chokepoints confer bargaining power. Countries controlling irreplaceable production steps gain influence disproportionate to their size.
• That power is not sovereign. Allied pressure, dependency on foreign customers and upstream suppliers all constrain how a chokepoint holder acts.
• Policy must be built on the distinction. Pretending leverage equals autonomy leads to strategic overreach; recognizing the gap allows more realistic alignment with partners.

The report situates the Dutch case within the broader escalation of technology controls among the United States, Europe and China. As export restrictions on semiconductor technology multiply, each round of measures forces chokepoint holders to choose sides — and to absorb the commercial consequences of those choices.

What does this mean going forward?

The HCSS analysis suggests The Hague will keep trading access to its chokepoint for alliance goodwill, while accepting that the terms are largely written in Washington rather than in The Hague. As great-power competition over semiconductor technology intensifies, the report implies, the value of Dutch leverage rises — but so does the cost of holding it.