
US-Led Buyers' Club Targets China's Export Leverage Over Chips and Rare Earths
Sept. 30 framework signed by the US, EU, Japan and two dozen nations targets steel overcapacity; a follow-on statement covers legacy chips, batteries and solar panels as China's export controls bite.
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The United States, European Union, Japan, South Korea and two dozen other nations signed a framework on Sept. 30 in Milwaukee to investigate global steel overcapacity, a first step toward what analysts call a buyers' club against China's export coercion. A narrower coalition including India and Mexico followed with a separate statement targeting cars, batteries, chemicals, legacy semiconductors and solar panels.
The push comes from an argument made by Shannon K. O'Neil, senior vice president of studies at the Council on Foreign Relations: China is weaponizing control over vital materials, inputs, technologies and goods, and Western market-based economies cannot match Beijing's hold on supply. They can, however, compete on demand.
How did China build its coercive toolkit?
China fired a warning shot in 2010. After the Japanese Coast Guard arrested a Chinese sea captain, Beijing curtailed rare earth exports to Japan, materials that underpin the nation's industrial base. After the US raised tariffs last year, China reran and expanded the playbook. It constricted exports of rare earths and permanent magnets, disrupting global car, semiconductor and other industrial manufacturing, and got the Trump administration to back down.
Beijing has also blacklisted European and US precision manufacturing, electric motor, aerospace and defense businesses on dual-use grounds. It now proposes new licensing regimes and export controls on solar, artificial intelligence, mineral refining technologies and other products.
The US has its own restrictions. Since 2019 it has limited exports of American software and chips to Entity List companies, including Huawei Technologies. In 2022 it blocked leading-edge semiconductors and their manufacturing equipment from reaching China more broadly. O'Neil argues the US remains outmatched by the breadth of manufacturing chokepoints China holds, and that prohibiting private companies from selling abroad sits uneasily with America's market-based fundamentals.
Why does buying power need allies?
US acquisitive power amounts to only one-third of all global purchases. That is not enough to unilaterally change China's economic direction or behavior. Chinese companies have redirected products to other markets.
The record shows the limits of unilateral action. The US barred Chinese telecom gear from its networks, shut out Chinese-made connected vehicles and leveled broad tariffs. Huawei still became the world's largest manufacturer of telecom equipment. BYD became the biggest EV maker. China's global exports rose to record levels.
Scale changes the math, according to O'Neil's analysis:
- The US, Europe, Japan, South Korea, Canada and Australia together wield more than half of global consumption.
- Adding Brazil, Mexico, India, the UK and Argentina would top two-thirds of all global consumer spending.
A buyers' club of that size would give less running room to China's unprofitable firms exporting at fire-sale prices. It would offset the inflationary effects of substituting cheap Chinese goods by maintaining economies of scale and specialization with rerouted supply chains. It would also afford nations safety in numbers against potential Chinese retaliation.
What could enforcement look like?
The current agreements are voluntary and lack teeth. Countries could add binding mechanisms: coordinated tariffs, quotas or import bans. Members could facilitate investment between themselves and match subsidies.
O'Neil writes that such a club would become "a potent and asymmetric tool that China couldn't match." She points to China's willingness to strike a deal with Europe on car imports as evidence Beijing wants to ward off a coordinated pushback, while noting the deal's cap was higher than last year's overall imports, making it a good outcome for China.
The steel framework addresses a concrete imbalance: China produces roughly half of all steel worldwide, and its capacity is projected to grow. The follow-on statement covering legacy semiconductors, batteries, chemicals and solar panels extends the same overcapacity logic to the sectors where Chinese exports press hardest on allied producers.
What stands in the way?
Diplomacy is the constraint. Tariffing Seoul, Tokyo and Brussels alongside Beijing, in O'Neil's assessment, makes commercial camaraderie harder. Blanket levies and prohibitions dull the benefits and raise the costs of collaboration, so Washington needs to pick its economic battles and give countries a reason to join.
The moment favors mobilization because China's manufacturing overbuild is swamping the global economy, and the EU in particular is growing more assertive. O'Neil's verdict frames the competitive stakes directly: in the weaponizing of production, the US today cannot beat Shenzhen, but working together, the world's market-based economies could blunt it.
Source: cfr.org
More from Grace Kim
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Market editor covering people, launches and day-to-day practice in Semiconductors, chip manufacturing, hardware, AI compute at Chip Dispatch.
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